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A Response to Stephen Windmueller’s Essay
By Robert Michael
I would like to thank the editor of Menorah Review for the opportunity
to reply to Stephen F. Windmueller’s review of my book, “A Concise
History of American Anti-Semitism,” which appeared in Issue 67.
Admittedly, if I were to write this book today, I would mention the
amazing movement of conservative Protestantism toward Zionism.
Even so, ask a convinced evangelical Protestant what will happen to a
Jew, an authentic Jew, when he/she dies, and by virtue of their theology they will say, “you must go to hell.” I once sat for jury duty and
while awaiting the slow grind of the judicial system, I sat next to an
interpreter for the deaf. She and I discussed many subjects with great
joy until I mentioned I was a Jew. But then she recovered and showed
me how to sign, “I am a Jew.” I then asked her where I would go when
I died. She replied, “I’d defend you in this life against any injustice.” I
persisted, and she told me, “Well, you will go to hell.”
“How about my parents and grandparents, where are they now?”
“Why in hell, of course.”
Granted the importance of economic, secular, leftist, Islamist anti-Semitism, Christianity nevertheless remains its fons et origo. Postwar studies have confirmed that anti-Jewish ideology embodied within
the Christian religious perspective provided the fundamental basis
for American anti-Semitism, even apparent secular anti-Jewishness.
[See, e.g., Egal Feldman, “Dual Destinies: The Jewish Encounter with
Protestant America” (Chicago 1990).] After a careful study of American
opinion in the 1960s, for example, Charles Glock and Rodney Stark
were surprised to discover that, at a time of growing ecumenical
harmony, almost all Americans who were anti-Semitic (about half the
population) got their stereotypes of Jews from their Christian religions.
They believed that Jews were responsible for crucifying Christ; that
Jews could not be forgiven for this act until they converted; that God
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punished Jews because they rejected Him; that the Jews were responsible for their own suffering; that religious anti-Semitism was not
“demented” or “bizarre” but, on the contrary, eminently “respectable.”
At least through the 1960s, “historically, it is clear that the heart and
soul of anti-Semitism rested on Christianity.” [Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York 1966), xvi,
50-65, 73-4, 105, 185-7.]
American deference to Christianity has gone hand in hand with nativist
movements that claim to be based in great part on Christian values.
[Nativism consists of majority opposition to an internal minority group
perceived to be an alien threat to the majority’s values. B. H. Hartogensis, “Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-Believers in the United States,” The Yale Law Journal (March 1930), 660-1.]
Xenophobic and isolationist Americans centered their ideology on the
traditional beliefs that the Jews were the archetypal aliens and that
their nativist economic and political problems were rooted in a conspiracy led by “usurious” and “world-dominating” Jews.
Throughout the colonial period and after, despite many instances of
good Jewish-Christian relations, most Americans seemed to hold the
belief that Jews were cast out of the economy of salvation because
Jews rejected and crucified Christ and continued to do so in every generation. This anti-Jewish ideology was carried to the New World from
the Old. Just as each of the Emperor Napoleon I’s troops were believed
to carry a Marshal’s baton in their knapsacks, so immigrants carried
their anti-Semitism from Europe to America.
Anti-Jewish prejudice spread to non-Christians like Blacks and Indians,
who were indoctrinated into the Christian religion. Although the American brand of anti-Jewish bigotry was milder than its European progenitor, nevertheless, in colonial times and later, Jews were commonly
denigrated in the press, “Jew” being considered a dirty word. Although
no pogroms against Jews occurred in the American colonies, Jewish
cemeteries were desecrated and Jews were insulted because of their
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Jewishness. Many of the teachings of the Sunday schools and other
religious institutions were anti-Jewish. [Gordon Allport, The Nature of
Prejudice, 446.]
In the 1960s, even at a time of growing ecumenical harmony led by
the Catholic Vatican II Council, about half of the Americans interviewed
– both Catholic and Protestant, both lay and clergy – believed that:
• All Jews were responsible for crucifying Christ, and they could not
be forgiven for this act until they converted.
• God punishes Jews because they reject Christ.
• The Jews are responsible for their own suffering.
Glock and Stark concluded that “the heart and soul of anti-Semitism
rested on Christianity,” that 95 percent of Americans got their secular
stereotypes of Jews from the Christian religion. [Charles Glock and
Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York 1966),
xvi, 185-7, 50-65, 73-4, 105. See also Rodney Stark, et al., Wayward
Shepherds (New York 1971), 5, 9-10, 50; Alphons Silbermann , Sind
Wir Anti-Semiten? (Cologne 1982), 51-2.]
Gordon Allport concluded that religion stood as the focus of prejudice
because “it is the pivot of the cultural tradition of a group.” [Gordon
Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 446.] Christianity, unlike any other
group in Western history, has dominated the West for the last 1700
years.
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Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide: Similarities and Differences
“Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe
by Benjamin Lieberman.” Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
A review essay by Paul R. Bartrop
Like “genocide,” the term “ethnic cleansing” is new, but what it
describes is centuries old. The phrase was originally introduced by
reporters covering the Yugoslav wars of disintegration between 1991
and 1995, but as a course of action it is much older than that. In its
essence, ethnic cleansing means the forced and permanent removal
of one group of people, by another, from a region or territory, and the
subsequent occupation of that land by members of the perpetrator
group as though the target group had never existed there.
Generally speaking, any means can be (and have been) employed to
effect such removal: legislation; forced expulsion; voluntary evacuation; intimidation through threats; intimidation through violence; and
genocide – the ultimate form of permanent removal.
It is this final means that causes the greatest degree of confusion for
observers of the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing in the modern world.
In the eyes of many, genocide and ethnic cleansing equate directly
with each other, but a closer look at the two terms reveals that such
is not the case. Genocide, a crime in international law defined by
United Nations statute and incorporated precisely into the legal codes
of a majority of the world’s nation states, is a very precise category
of crime. Ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, is the name given to a
form of behavior embracing a number of crimes that fall within other
groupings: war crimes, crimes against humanity (both of which, it
should be emphasized, are categories of crimes, rather than crimes
per se), and, on occasion, the crime of genocide itself.
Consequently, there is no universally-recognized definition of ethnic
cleansing; nor is there a specific crime in international law that outlaws
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it – even though elements of the practice are banned under other legislation (for example, murder, deportation, torture, rape, persecution
on political, racial and religious grounds and genocide).
When Raphael Lemkin introduced the term genocide in 1944, in his
book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,” he wrote about the destruction
of a nation or ethnic group. The means to achieve such destruction, as
he saw it, did not include deportation or forced removal of populations
from a territory; these acts are not necessarily aimed at destroying the
group, just at moving it away from a designated piece of land. Then,
when the United Nations enacted the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, on December 9, 1948, its
key definitional term was “intent to destroy” – not “intent to remove.”
All of the ways in which this could be achieved, as outlined in Article
II of the Convention, are the means by which the United Nations,
through to today, considers that group destruction can take place.
Removal of a group in order to obtain coveted land, according to which
the group may retain its existence in another place – that is, ethnic
cleansing – is not group destruction occasioning genocide.
That having been said, of course, genocide can be employed to clear
territory of an unwanted population, but when this happens we find
that we have to interrogate the perpetrators as to their preferred goal:
acquisition of “cleansed” territory, or destruction of a targeted group?
Which is the priority? Is one simply a means to an end? And, ultimately, why should the distinction matter?
Untangling the knot is one of the tasks Benjamin Lieberman, of Fitchburg State College, Massachusetts, has set himself in “Terrible Fate:
Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe.” As can be readily
ascertained from the title, his primary concern is with the notion of
ethnic cleansing: genocide plays a part, certainly, but Lieberman is
most interested in the huge population movements that took place
in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and what
impact these movements had on forming the Europe we see before us
today.
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In considering his topic, Lieberman does not plead or moralize about
the justice or injustice of this or that situation: there is more than
enough of a damning or condemnatory nature, within the narrative
itself, that anything more from Lieberman would seem superfluous.
Commencing with an account of the fate of the Turks and Bulgarians of
Salonica in the nineteenth century, Lieberman takes his readers on an
engagingly-written tour of Eastern and Central Europe, the Near East
and the Russian Empire, and shows how it came about that vast areas
within these regions are no longer peopled in the same manner as
they used to be. Along the way, we witness pogroms, mass murders,
forced population movements, voluntary exile and genocide.
We see the Holocaust, described in its ethnic cleansing dimension, as
a phenomenon in which the Nazis and their collaborators sought the
total elimination of the Jews from society in order to reinforce their
own sense of ethnic “purity.” The territories then occupied would be –
as the terms in the German language expressed it – “Judenfrei” (“Jew
Free”), or “Judenrein” (“Cleansed of Jews); and this was well before
the majority of Jews who died in the death camps were even sent
there. Deprivation of liberty and incarceration in ghettos was a vital
step on the road to the ethnic cleansing of Europe’s Jews, as it began
the process of removal from the general (non-Jewish) population.
Lieberman is adamant that the Holocaust is not to be separated out
from the broader experience of European horror during the 20th century, and is most skillful in pointing out how it was a culmination of all
that had been developing beforehand. Yet perhaps the most appealing
dimension of Lieberman’s work is in the form his analysis of ethnic
cleansing takes. While his thematic division is largely chronological and
geographic, his “big picture” perspective shows that ethnic cleansing
over the past two centuries has in fact been a phenomenon that has
transcended boundaries; that has operated from a variety of motives;
that has caused a massive amount of damage in physical, economic
and psychological terms; and that has had a lasting – and probably
permanent – impact on the composition of modern European society
and politics.

Winter/Spring 2008 no. 68 | 9
While this might seem so self-evident as to be a given, Lieberman’s
extensive research brings to the fore – “rescued” might be a more useful word – a history that needs to be re-examined for a new readership
precisely because of its obviousness. It is not enough simply to presume that ethnic cleansing is a bad thing; scholars need to be aware
of just how extensive that destruction was, of which people were targeted, and of why they were. In short, a 21st century audience needs
to become aware of the finer details of each and every case of the
horrendous criminal acts to which various peoples in the 19th and 20th
centuries were subjected. Benjamin Lieberman’s work will prove to be
of exceptional assistance to a new generation of scholars tackling the
important task of asking serious questions about what was perhaps the
most defining characteristic of the last 150 years, and for his efforts he
is to be commended, and his work disseminated widely.
Paul R. Bartrop is head, Department of History, Bialik College, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, and a contributing editor.
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On Biblical Personality
By Matthew Schwartz
“Biblical Stories for Psychotherapy and Counseling: A Sourcebook,”
by Matthew Schwartz and Kalman Kaplan, Haworth Press.
“The Fruit of Her Hands: Psychology of the Biblical Woman,” by Matthew Schwartz and Kalman Kaplan, Eerdmans.
Menorah Review provides a congenial and unique format for discussion on new books in Judaica including, in this instance, some of my
thoughts on two books of which I am co-author.
An American college class that deals with the Hebrew Bible typically
includes a heterogeny of Christians, Jews, Moslems and non-believers.
A conscientious teacher will hope to avoid insulting students or forcing
a narrow argumentative approach on them. In my classroom, I present
to students the varying points of view from the most devout and traditional to the most radically untraditional and tell them to make up their
own minds. In these two books, we two authors have not argued a
doctrinal position as to the origins of the Hebrew Bible. We each have
our own ideas as to the authoring of the Bible, and this issue is indeed
very important not only to its readers but to world history. However,
this is not our interest here. We prefer to engage our readers as we do
our students on the common ground of the Hebrew Bible as offering a
unique and significant wisdom.
Much of the direction of the study of Bible in universities today is in
the scientific mode, seeking to define the Bible in terms of archaeology
and higher criticism. This is true even in some religious seminaries.
Popular books like “The Da Vinci Code” have helped to spur a certain
cynicism toward traditional Christianity, and scholarly works like Professor Bart Ehrman’s have hit the best seller list with their questioning
of the accuracy of New Testament texts and their accounts of alternate gospels known to the ancients and rediscovered only recently.
My colleague, Kalman Kaplan, a psychologist, and I, a historian, have
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published two books (“Biblical Stories for Psychotherapy: A Sourcebook,” 2004, and “The Fruit of Her Hands: The Psychology of Biblical
Woman,” 2007), which follow a literary and psychological approach.
The Hebrew Bible is a treasury of human portraits which offers important insights into human personality and history. Our first book argues
that modern Freudian based psychology, while offering very significant
ideas, is heavily dependent on a view of people that it derives from
Greek mythology and theater. Study of characters like Oedipus, Electra
and Narcissus draws one toward the tragedians’ view of people, in
which one can seek some degree of self-understanding, but in doing
so can destroy himself, as Oedipus and Narcissus actually do Devotion
to a seemingly noble ideal will involve errors in both understanding
and in human relationships that can lead inexorably to suicide as with
Antigone, and heroic achievement too must lead surely to death, as
with Achilles. The high incidence of suicide and child exposure in both
Graeco-Roman literature and history expresses the tone of Greek
thought and life.
The Hebrew Bible offers a very different view of people. Life is not essentially tragic or capricious, but instead has important meaning. One
could sit down to a banquet with Abraham or Moses and feel secure
that food as well as the conversation will be both tasty and kosher.
If one sits to dine with the family of Agamemnon, or even with an
Olympian god, one can never be sure that he will not be served poison
or even the flesh of his own relatives. People can better themselves
by learning and by experience. They should try to be virtuous and
God-fearing, not heroic. They must choose life over death, and suicide
is not an acceptable option, as it was for so many Greeks and Romans.
We present 58 stories of Biblical characters, relying freely on the
insights of both rabbinic commentators and modern Psychology. How
did Biblical people deal with challenges like illness, disappointment,
handicaps, freedom, self-esteem, child raising, marriage problems or
ageing? We provide also a brief psychological commentary to each
story, explaining how the story could be used in actual cases of counseling. We propose that it is high time to develop a psychotherapy
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which makes extensive use of Biblical personality models.
The Hebrew Bible is a book of teaching which follows a path very different from the mythological. This is a point recognized by interpreters
of the Bible as diverse as Professor Yehezkel Kaufmann and Rabbi
Zalman Sorotskin. The Hebrew Bible is for us neither preachy nor
rigidly didactic. Its strength for our purposes in this book rests in its
psychological insight and its positive, life-oriented, non-mythological,
monotheistic attitude.
“The Fruit of Her Hands: A Psychology of Biblical Woman” centers on
the theme that Biblical women can have a strong grasp of their place
in God’s plan for the unfolding of history. These women feel that history has a beginning and an ultimate goal and that their contribution to
that process is essential. A woman can act with wisdom, strength and
courage in pursuing those aims. Her relationships with other people
and with the daily world are tempered by her own higher purpose. Part
of the Biblical woman’s function is expressed in the Genesis II term
“help meet opposite” which, translated from King James English into
our own, has the connotation of a “suitable help in loyal opposition.”
She must meld her independence of thought and act with her genuine
support of others, all this set in the context of seeking to fulfill her
historical God-given potential and the world’s.
Certainly not every woman in the Hebrew Bible totally succeeds in
these tasks. Some fail badly and some are thoroughly rotten characters, e.g. Jezebel or Zeresh, but the best of them score very high
and enjoy lives full of purpose. “The Fruit of Her Hands” follows the
format of the earlier book, offering portraits of over 50 Biblical women,
some good some evil but all memorable. Sarah, Rebecca and Ruth are
obvious choices. Rahab, Achsa, Rizpah and Gomer are less obvious
but hardly less interesting. The Biblical woman contrasts strongly with
heroines of Greek myth and of later Western literature, who seem
unable to define themselves other than in terms of relationships
with men be it fathers, husbands, lovers, brothers or sons, and the
relationships are typically unhealthy. Flaubert’s Mme. Bovary destroys
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herself and her family in meaningless affairs. Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina
too abandons her family for an affair and ends by throwing herself
under a moving train. In the Greek drama, Iphigenia is offered by her
father as a sacrifice, Medea murders her sons, Jocasta, mother/wife
of Oedipus, hangs herself, and Pandora is a pretty messenger sent by
Zeus in a nasty trick to bring misery to the world. These women are
left frustrated, unfulfilled and often destructive.
Menorah Review’s format perhaps will allow a personal note. My colleague, Kaplan, is a professor of both clinical and social psychology
with many years of experience. We have worked together for 25 years
on a variety of scholarly projects. We are very different in our training,
our skills, our lifestyles and our personalities, but I respect Kal’s intellectual honesty and openness, and we share recognition of the beauty
and depth of the Hebrew Bible as world class literature. We have found
that two working together can accomplish more than the mere sum of
two parts.
Matthew Schwartz is a professor in the history department of Wayne
State University and a contributing editor
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Telling Tales
“Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: Historys Double
Helix, ” edited by Robert Rotberg. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
A review essay by Peter J. Haas
The motivating thesis of the book is set forth in its very first sentences. “Every conflict is justified by a narrative of grievance, accusation
and indignity. Conflicts depend on narratives, and in some senses
cannot exist without a detailed explanation of how and why the battles
began and why one side, and only one side, is in the right.” (Preface,
pg vii.) The 11 essays that comprise this book are not, however,
about narrative structure of meaning per se, although this is certainly
discussed. Rather they all address one specific set of competing narratives, namely, those of the Palestinians and the Israelis. In fact, the
narration of this conflict, in its various forms, serves as the paradigmatic example of the thesis. The purpose of the book, then, is not to
demonstrate the power of narratives, but rather to get at the structure
of the genre “conflict narrative” by using the Palestinian narratives
and the Israeli narratives as prime, even defining, examples. The end
result of reading the 11 essays that make up this book, and which are
implicitly and sometimes explicitly in conversation with each other, is
to see that there are in fact different narratives in this conflict, that
each is a construct that has its own internal consistency and that both
are constructed with the other in mind (hence the double helix imagery). That this assertion has to be argued at all is already an indication
of how entrenched we all are in the narratives that construct the conflict and give it its various meanings.
The stage for the dialogue (and sometimes monologue) which follows
is set in the opening essay by Robert Rotberg, who also served as
editor of the volume. “In Building Legitimacy through Narrative” he
argues that both Israeli Jews and Palestinians are peoples who have
been, and are still now, constructing their own identities through the
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medium of grand narratives (my phrase, not his). The essays gathered
here, Rotberg tells us, will take us through a series of propositions.
The first is that conflict narratives not only define the conflict, but also
function as a coping mechanism. The narratives articulate both the
legitimacy of the cause and the justification, even glorification, of the
sacrifice needed for the struggle to succeed. For the Palestine-Israeli
conflict there are two narrative complexes which are both distinct and
yet tightly intertwined and interdependent. Second, both sets of narratives are built on the need to create a national identity, a need growing
out of a shared experience under British domination and formed in
more or less competition with each other. Third, for this conflict to
move toward any form of reconciliation, some change in the grand
narrative of each side will have to be made; if nothing more than the
simple recognition that the other narrative exists, has some legitimacy
and needs to be taken seriously. But, forth, any attempt to change the
governing narrative will be resisted, even strenuously. Nonetheless,
fifth, until such a mutual recognition is achieved no “legitimate” reduction of the conflict can even begin to occur.
In this spirit, the contributors are focused not on delegitimizing one
side or the other as much as they are focused on breaking down, or
deconstructing, the narratives that each side is putting forward. There
are no calls here for the destruction of the State of Israel, for example,
or for the artificiality of the term “Palestinian”. The aim, rather, is to
step outside the narrative structures which demand these outcomes
and discuss the narratives as social constructs, not all-inclusive and
true lists of facts. In other worlds, the aim of the book is not so much
to get Jews to give up the Israeli narrative as it is to acknowledge
the existence of a Palestinian narrative worthy of attention, and not
to get Arab readers to give up the Palestinian narrative but rather to
acknowledge that there is an Israeli narrative worthy of consideration.
The next essay, “Israel-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict” by Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon, spells out in greater
detail the function of a “conflict narrative.” They note that among
the chief functions of such a narrative is to offer a group a collective
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memory which justifies its own struggle, stresses its own victimhood,
delegitimizes the other side, and presents an argument for unity and
steadfastness to carry on the battle. One aspect of such a narrative,
the authors argue, is to portray one’s own side as truly interested in
peace, while ones opponents are not; and in fact if the other side does
make a gesture for peace, this is to be taken as insincere or duplicitous.
This essay is followed by a lengthy analysis by Dina Porat on the development of the standard Israeli Jewish narrative. Her most interesting
point is that the Israeli (or, really, the Zionist) narrative was not originally constructed in opposition to the Arab narrative, which was, as far
as it even existed, largely ignored. Rather the Zionist counter-narrative
was aimed at European views of the Jews in general, and at the internal Diaspora politics of European Jewish communities more particularly. As Porat points out, the internal struggles among various Zionist
factions, and the struggles with anti-Zionist forces within especially
East European Jewish society were much more pressing concerns.
Even after the riots in the late 1930s, when the existence of an Arab
nationalism thrust itself on the consciousness of the Yishuv, relations
with the British occupation and concerns about the rise of Fascism in
Europe were of much more concern than the local Arabs, who, as Porat
pointedly notes, “were not perceived as carriers of consciousness and
history (pg. 61).” In short, the construction of the pre-state Zionist
narrative had much more to do with Europe than with the Orient. Arabs were simply not relevant in shaping a Zionist narrative of identity.
Porat’s analysis is followed Saleh Abdel Jawad’s discussion of the Arab/
Palestinian narratives of the 1948 war. His thesis is that the Arab
narratives are much less well-formed than the Zionist/Israeli one for
at least three reasons. One is the existence of several Arab narratives,
coming out of different national and even class perspectives. Syrians
tell a different story of what went wrong in 1948 than do Egyptians, for
example; and the rich landowners have different stories than do the
peasants. This diversity is compounded by the varying and changing
ideologies of the diverse Arab states, whose changing fortunes work
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against the creation of a single stable Arab counter-narrative. Second
is the overarching power of the Israeli narrative. In essence, Abdel
Jawad argues, the few Arab historians at work find themselves having
to operate within the framework of the Israeli narrative and are having
a hard time disentangling themselves from it. Finally, there is the issue
of access to sources. Much of Palestinian history was destroyed by the
Israelis, and what has survived is often sealed off by various governments (Israeli and Arab) for their own purposes. For example, many
of the military-dominated Arab governments are pushing forward
narratives that concentrate on the failure of civilian leadership while
suppressing evidence pointing to military failures. Abdel Jawad ends
by noting that the construction of a coherent history of the 1948 war is
important not only in order to present a fuller picture of what “really”
happened, but also as a vehicle for Arab healing and internal reconciliation. Through such a history, maybe an acknowledgment of both
people’s history can begin to take place, and thereby the first steps
toward learning and mutual accommodation.
The least helpful of the essays collected here is Nadim Rouhanas
“Zionisms Encounter with the Palestinians.” The essay can roughly be
summarized as follows: by determining that the Jewish homeland had
to be in Palestine, the Zionist movement was obliged to use force and
violence; this force and violence became the cultural basis for the Zionist relationship to the Palestinians; such force and violence provoked
the natural reaction among Palestinians of resistance; this has lead to
a culture of fear among the Zionists which only leads them to more
extreme acts of force and violence; if not stopped, they will eventually
repeat the atrocities of 1948; the only hope is for outside international
powers to force the Israelis to acknowledge the Palestinian story.
Although the attention to Israeli fear is a useful insight into the consequences of the “feedback loop” of the two conflict narrative traditions,
the rest of the essay is little more than a retelling of a version of the
Palestinian narrative. There is little scholarly distance here, an observation made explicitly made by Mordechai Bar-On in his essay. In
contrast, the larger purpose of Bar-On’s contribution to the volume is
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to give us a reflective history of Israeli historiography. Bar-Ons essay is
helpful in bringing to the surface both the problems of writing a history
of the 1948 period, and the changes that have occurred with the rise
of the “new historians” in the 1990s. While he has his problems with
some of the revisionist histories being produced by Israeli historians,
Bar-On clearly thinks that such rethinking is useful overall. Post-Zionism, he notes, has created deep rifts in Israeli society, but in so doing
has opened new possibilities for understanding, if not necessarily accepting in its totality, the Palestinian narratives. His hope is that eventually Palestinians will be able to use the Israeli situation as a model
for modifying their own historiography in a way that will be more open
to what Israeli scholars have to say.
Expressing some hope that this could indeed happen is the subject of
Mark Tessler’s essay, “Narratives and Myths about Arab Intransigence
toward Israel” and the following piece by Ilan Pappe on “bridging
narratives.” A political scientist, Tessler asks us to reexamine some of
the actual data, both in terms of overt policies of Arab states and in
terms of public opinion polls. His basic questions are whether or not
Arab attitudes toward Israel have shown themselves to be enduring
and unchanging, and whether Arab critiques are about the existence
of the State of Israel altogether or more about various policies of the
government of Israel. His analysis leads to the conclusion that, first,
Arab policies and attitudes seem to be malleable, changing according
to context; and second, that over time critique has been aimed more
at policies of the State rather than to its existence. It is of course
important to put these findings into the social context of Palestinian
and Arab society, which Tessler does. He notes at the very outset that
narratives are based more on attitude and emotion than truth but
nonetheless have to be regarded as real, even though they may not be
accurate. People, after all, believe them sincerely. His point is not so
much to debunk the Israeli narrative or idealize the Arab narrative as
it is to note that such narratives are in the end mythic, and insofar as
the facts upon which these myth are based are always more complex
and nuanced than the narratives allow, these mythic narratives are
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contingent. Pappe’s approach is to suggest that it is not enough simply
to critique the Israeli grand narrative, but one must build a counter
narrative, or what he terms a “bridge narrative,” that is, a story that
both sides, in this case Palestinian and Israeli historians, would work
on together. For this to be accomplished, both sides have to start from
where they are and deconstruct their own sides narrative while working towards the other. His essay is thus a call for Israeli historians to
begin the process of writing a new narrative, one that takes not only
the Palestinian evidence (say, oral testimony) into account, but also
looks at the normally forgotten groups, the disposed Arab farmers or
the Sephardic Jews, for example. His assumption is that eventually
Palestinian/Arab historians will take up the parallel work.
The notion of a “bridging” narrative is taken further in the next essay
in which Dan Bar-On and Sami Adwan discuss their attempt to forge
just such an artifact in a joint project with Israeli and Palestinian
teachers. As it turns out the project resulted not in a single joint or
“bridge” narrative but in a series of booklets in which a version of the
Israeli narrative, and a version of the Palestinian narrative were printed side-by-side. The essay concludes with a sample that deals with
the time of the Balfour Declaration. The project is impressive not only
because it happened at all, but because it was conducted during the
“Al-Aqsa” intifada with all the physical and psychological barriers for
cooperative work that that implies. The end result was not agreement
on a common narrative, but a kind of opening among pupils on each
side to the narrative (and pain) of the other side. If nothing else, the
exercise of producing the first few booklets of the projected series
shows that dedicated teachers could, with some success, leave the
confines of their own narratives and find some way to accommodate
the other. The authors discuss how the project managed to unfold
against the immense psychological counterforce of Israeli roadblocks
and Palestinian suicide bombers.
The last two essays, one by Nathan J. Brown on the debates surrounding the creation of Palestinian textbooks and the other by Eyal Naveh
on debates in the Israeli education system, highlight remarkably
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similar issues. In each case there is a foundational debate over what
the students’ national identity should be, how that identity should
be constructed in terms of the larger world, what kind of student the
system should produce, and what values are to be taught. Given the
competing agendas and needs of the two societies, it should come as
no surprise that in both cases the actual textbooks reflect compromises and so project mixed messages. On the Palestinian side, there is
a strong attempt to create a Palestinian national identity in a society
with deep traditions of other loyalties: family, tribe, religion, Arab and
so forth. On the Israeli side, there are competing ethnic and religious
identities: secular vs. religious, for example, or Ashkenazic vs. Sephardic vs. Russian vs. indigenous Arab. In both societies, educators
and textbook authors had to negotiate difficult and at times mutually
exclusive political shoals to produce textbooks that convey something
like a coherent message in both form and content.
Maybe what is so useful in these final two contributions is that they
illustrate how plastic the “narratives” are that are being conveyed in
the classroom. The narrative structures so confidently asserted at the
beginning of this volume dissolve in the end into a polyphony of voices
views and visions. It may be precisely in this chaos of the middle that
openness to something other than mutually exclusive narratives, if not
some sort of “bridging” narrative, might one day find a place. In any
case, it is refreshing to see at work a variety of scholars who are for
the most part able to step out of their socially constructed and comfortable “realities” and reflect on how “conflict narratives” are created
and deployed. It is also refreshing to see Israelis and Palestinians who
have some hope that the current double helix of mutually-exclusive
grand narratives can indeed be overcome. This book is a modest, but
powerful, step in moving us in that direction.
Peter J. Haas is the Abba Hillel Silver Professor of Jewish Studies,
chairs the Department of Religion at Case Western Reserve University,
and is a contributing editor.

Winter/Spring 2008 no. 68 | 21

Templ(Ar)Ing
A poem by Richard Sherwin
I have friends more full of faith than I
waiting for the Temple from the sky

Rabbi architects and artists crafting all
the tools of priestly service lamps and altars

Theyre raising herds and flocks for sacrifices
Growing incense wine and herbs for spices

The vestments and the men and choirs are ready
The plans are finished, the will and hands are steady

Talmudic arguments fly fast and thick
Should we wait on Gd or build it quick

Others meanwhile more or less like me
look on enthralled amused or panicky

Or worse indifferent or furious
theyre still imposing Gd and stones on us

Me I leave the Temple to my friends
along with other mountain miracles

I walk my daily prayers along the sea
counting waves and omer, frothing free
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And do the most I can of what's to do
Invite a Kohen to a barbecue
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The Ancient Grudge: The Merchant of Venice and Shylock’s Christian Problem
1. The Prologue
Part 1 by Jack D. Spiro
Look Again
The Merchant of Venice is one of the most provocative and equivocal of
Shakespeare’s plays. This is primarily true because of Shylock’s pivotal
role and the multiple interpretations of his character through the centuries. Is it possible to determine the identity of Shakespeare’s Shylock? The following pages endeavor to answer this venerable question
with all the historically and contextually relevant evidence available to
us.
William Levingston, a merchant in eighteenth century Willamsburg,
Virginia planted the seed for the first legitimate theater in the colonies.
In May 1752, the Hallams, a theatrical company from London, electrified the theater-goers of Willamsburg by transforming their stage into
the first truly legitimate theater of the New World.
What an evening that must have been! Read all about it in the Virginia
Gazette of August 21, 1752:
“We are desired to inform the Publick, that as the Company…lately
from London, have obtained His Honour the Governour’s Permission,
and have with great Expense, entirely altered the Play-House of Williamsburg to a regular [i.e., legitimate] Theater, fit for the reception of
Ladies and Gentlemen, and the Execution of their own Performances,
they intend to open on the first Friday in September next, with a Play
call’d ‘The Merchant of Venice,’ (written by Shakespeare)….The Ladies
desired to give timely notice…for their places in the house, and on the
Day of Performance to send their servants early to keep them in order
to prevent Trouble and Disappointment.”
The opening was dynamite. Not one empty seat, the house packed
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with excited “first-nighters” including the Royal Governor and his official family. Shakespeare came to a legitimate theater in the New World
for the first time with the most controversial play he ever wrote.
It is possible that John de Sequeyra, living in Williamsburg at the time,
was also in attendance that night. He was a Sephardic Jew whose
family came from Portugal during the Inquisition. He was born in London in 1716, came to Williamsburg when he was 29 and died there at
the age of 79. During 22 of those years he was visiting physician at
the “Lunatic Asylum,” which now called Eastern State Hospital. He was
also one of the most respected physicians in early Williamsburg. And
something as glittering as opening night of the first legitimate theater
may have enticed him to occupy one of its seats.
De Sequeyra could have been motivated also by the major lead in the
play – a Jew named Shylock who may have been of Sephardic descent
since he lived in Venice. Did the play make him uneasy and uncomfortable? Did the play agitate the non-Jewish audience? Of course we don’t
know, but chances are it did in some way because it has been agitating
audiences since its initial performance at the end of the 17th century
at the Globe Theater in London.
But in May 1943, we know it delighted its audience at the Burgtheater
in Vienna. The Holocaust has been raging for 17 months. Viennese
Jews have already been transported in cattle cars to the eastern death
camps. The city on the Danube is Judenrein. Members of the Nazi
party in Vienna think it’s an opportune time to celebrate their achievement with a production of The Merchant of Venice. The part of Shylock
is played by Werner Krauss. One critic comments that when Krauss
appeared “something revoltingly alien and startlingly repulsive crawled
across the stage.” And another critic describes Krauss’ Shylock with
his “unsteady, cunning little eyes; the greasy caftan with the yellow
prayer-shawl slung round; the splay-footed, shuffling walk; the foot
stamping with rage; the claw-like gestures with the hands; the voice,
now bawling, now muttering – all add up to a pathological image of the
East European Jewish type, expressing all its inner and outer uncleanli-
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ness, emphasizing danger through humor.” Krauss was a zealous Nazi.
Fifty-six years later, The Merchant of Venice is playing at the Shakespeare Theater in Washington, D.C. Hal Holbrook’s Shylock walks on
stage thinking about the loan that Bassanio requested he extend to the
merchant Antonio. He is tall, straight-backed, imposing in appearance,
unmistakably Jewish with his head-covering and distinctive apparel. He
speaks with authority and dignity. We know that this man cannot be
easily intimidated. He takes pride in the legacy of his people, and he is
aware of what they have endured through the centuries. His livelihood
is not one that he considers dishonorable because he employs it with
unreserved honesty. But he is subjected to relentless abuse and physical humiliation from the non-Jews in Venice where he works and lives
with his daughter Jessica.
I first saw the play in 1960 at Stratford-upon-Avon, with Peter O’Toole
in the role of Shylock. His Shylock was a man of dignified bearing and
diction intensely contrasted to a community of restive, temperamental
Christians. Then I saw the video of Sir Lawrence Olivier’s Shylock – a
sedate, top-hatted, aristocratic 19th century banker. At the Folger in
Washington, D.C., I saw another Shylock pitted against a black Antonio
reading the Wall Street Journal and discussing deals on his cellular
phone.
With only 400 lines, on stage in only five of 20 scenes – with the
richly varied interpretations of Charles Macklin, Henry Irving, Edmund
Kean, Werner Kraus, Lawrence Olivier, Orson Welles, Frederick Valk,
Peter O’Toole, Warren Mitchell, Patrick Stewart, Dustin Hoffman, Hal
Holbrook, Al Pacino, and many others – is there any character in
the Shakespearean repertory who can summon forth the sweeping
range of diverse and contradictory portrayals more exhaustively than
Shylock? Ay, there’s the rub! A revolting Shylock in Vienna, a noble
Shylock in Washington. Is there any way that we can possibly know
Shakespeare’s Shylock – the Shylock that his peerlessly gifted creator
intended to convey? Has any other play written by him provoked as
much passionate contention, elicited as much discord as The Merchant

26 | VCU Menorah Review
of Venice? Through the decades, critics have been so variably at odds
with each other in their readings that you might think we were referring to a vast assortment of different plays altogether. Shylock, to use
Karl Jaspers’s expression, belongs to the “infinitely interpretable.”
One of the reasons for the multiplicity of perceptions is the fact that
the play is clearly characterized. Norman Rabkin wrote that by an
“inexhaustible complexity [which] refuses to permit an unequivocal
resolution [based largely on] an unresolvably problematic sense of
human experience....At every point at which we want simplicity we get
complexity.” (1981, pp. 28-29) In presenting us with a profusion of
equivocal signals and unresolved problems, the play always urges us,
as Hazard Adams put it, to “look again.” (1969, p. 141) No matter
how many times we see the play or read it, we seem to be always
looking again. Every time I see it or read it, that is precisely what I
find myself doing, which is the impetus for this book: to look yet again.
The Dyer’s Hand
One reason we feel impelled to do so relates to our playwright’s life
and what he personally believed, about which there is much ado about
virtually nothing. We know so little about the man, which in itself probably makes the concept that John Keats called “negative capability” all
the more appropriate in the endeavor to understand The Merchant of
Venice or any other play by Shakespeare. (Finney, 1963, pp. 238-244,
326-333, 384-385, 472-481, 504-505, 532-537, 578-667, 712-742)  
Negative capability is the creative, unparalleled genius of giving mutually conflicting notions full imaginative development....opening the
mind to all kinds of possibilities, keeping it free of absolute certainty.
This concept was first discussed by Keats in a letter he wrote to his
brothers in December 1817: "...it struck me what quality went to form
a man of achievement, especially in literature, and which Shakespeare
possessed so enormously – I mean Negative Capability, that is, when
a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without
any irritable reaching after fact and reason." Two years later Keats
wrote to his brother George: "The only means of strengthening one's
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intellect is to make up one's mind about nothing -- to let the mind be
a thoroughfare for all thoughts." Keats made a distinction between
reason and imagination in literature. Reason, by nature, seeks to construct an absolute and comprehensive system of philosophy into which
it can fit and by which it can explain all of the facts of experience.
Imagination apprehends truth in individual, isolated intuitions. The
imaginative mind is content with these isolated particles of truth, but
the rational mind tries to fit imaginative intuitions into a rational system. The negatively capable person of imagination can get out of himself and his environment and into the poetic persons and environments
which his imagination creates. He lives not only in this world but also
in a thousand worlds. To enter the minds of others completely is to
understand them and, by understanding them, to pardon their faults,
to love them for their virtues. The negatively capable character "is not
itself – it has no self – it is every thing and nothing – It has no character…it has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen....”
The literary critic, William Hazlitt, preceded John Keats in identifying
this concept when he said that Shakespeare had "no personal character"– by means of observation and imagination, he could see life
through the minds of others...he represented, with understanding and
with justice, both the good and the evil, the noble and the base. Here
are some excerpts from an essay Hazlitt wrote in 1815:
1) “[Shakespeare] was the least of an egotist that it was possible to
be. He was nothing in himself, but he was all that others were, or that
they could become. He not only had in himself the germs of every faculty and feeling, but he could follow them by anticipation, intuitively,
into all their conceivable ramifications, through every change of fortune or conflict of passion, or turn of thought....There was no respect
of persons with him....He was like the genius of humanity, changing
places with all of us at pleasure, and playing with our purposes as with
his own.”
2) “[Shakespeare] took no part in the scene he describes, but gave
fair play to all his characters, and left virtue and vice, folly and wis-
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dom, right and wrong, to fight it out between themselves, just as they
do on their'old fighting stage'--the world.”
3) "His characters are real beings of flesh and blood; they speak like
men, not like authors. One might suppose that he had stood by at the
time and overheard all that passed." (Finney 1951, 1965 passim).
Negative capability is the power of one mind imagining itself into
another mind, which Shakespeare may have contemplated in Sonnet
111: “...my nature is subdued to what it works in, like the dyer’s
hand.”
Northrop Frye recognizes the same characteristic in the following
excerpts: “Shakespeare seems to have had less of an ego center than
any major poet of our culture....[Shakespeare] refrains from trying
to impose any sort of personal attitude on us, and shows no interest
in anything except his play....there is no passage in Shakespeare’s
plays...which cannot be explained entirely in terms of its dramatic
function and context....there is nothing which owes its existence
to Shakespeare’s desire to ‘say’ something....Shakespeare had no
opinions, no values, no philosophy, no principles of anything except
dramatic structure.” (1965, passim)
These passages – Frye's way of saying that Shakespeare was "negatively capable” -- certainly help to explain why we know almost nothing about the playwright. His ego was so subdued that he left little
trace of his own identity. As W. H. Auden observed, he was, “to all
intents and purposes, anonymous.”
The conundrums of interpretation bring us to one of the most prominent dichotomies of interpretation in all of Shakespeare’s plays and
the one that primarily concerns us: Do the contents of The Merchant
of Venice tell us that the play is anti-Jewish or do they indicate something else altogether? Some say that Shakespeare was trying to tone
down the discordant anti-Semitism of Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew
of Malta with a more sympathetic portrait of the Jew while others see
Shakespeare as trying to surpass the unabashed anti-Semitism of
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Marlowe. (Ribner, 1964, p. 45) There will be more about this later.
H. B. Charlton is one of the most unequivocal proponents of the anti-Semitism theory. He writes that Shakespeare “planned a Merchant
of Venice to let the Jew dog have it....The text itself preserves enough
evidence of the author’s fixed intent to exhibit his Shylock as an
inhuman scoundrel whose diabolical cunning is bent on gratifying a
satanic lust for Christian flesh, the Jew, in fact, who was the ogre of
the Medieval story and the cur to be exacerbated by all honest men.”
(1973, p. 7) Harold Bloom states: “One would have to be blind, deaf,
and dumb not to recognize that [this play] is a profoundly anti-Semitic
work.” (1998, p. 171)   Bloom would have to consider me blind, deaf
and dumb since I advocate the contrary position. When we examine
the play thoroughly, historically, comparatively, contextually, and empathically, Bloom’s position, I believe, becomes untenable.
The antithetical interpretation was stated, among many others, by
John Cooper who wrote that “we are not obliged by any historical
evidence to think that Shakespeare intended to depict a Jew as a
grotesque character or that such a stupid caricature was presented to
the play’s Elizabethan audience.” It is certainly verifiable from the text
itself that Shakespeare took great pains to humanize Shylock into a
portrait radically different from the usual portrait of the medieval morality and mystery plays, which reached their culmination in Marlowe’s
Barabas. Which is the Christian, which the Jew? We will see that every
character in the play, without exception, is all too human with foibles
and flaws that match or exceed Shylock’s. Bernard Grebanier goes
so far as to say that Shakespeare was incapable of bigotry and above
prejudice. (in Cooper 1970, p. 118)
One of the major problems we face is that the text is not only ambiguous but paradoxical in the sense that there are passages which could
underscore and other passages which could undermine the anti-Jewish, stereotypical image. I am also aware, of course, of the danger of
equating one’s own presuppositions with the author’s actual intentions.
The truth, therefore, has to come directly from the internal evidence
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which, I believe, reinforces not a “pro-Jewish” or “anti-Jewish” playwright, but the playwright’s unparalleled gift of “negative capability;”
namely, the natural faculty of imagining himself into the minds of
others – all others – as well as into other times, places, and cultures,
into a world where anti-Semitism was pervasive and endemic. By negating his own ego, thereby suspending all judgment and subduing the
temptation to be didactic, Shakespeare reflects the mirror of nature as
it truly was in reality; that is, the nature of the negative, pernicious,
and ultimately perilous interconnections between Jew and Christian –
the centuries of animosity beyond understanding; the persistence of
substituting the label “Jew” or “Christian” for human being; the unwillingness to engage in genuine dialogues of mutual trust and friendship;
the literal, unquestioning acceptance of scripture as absolute truth;
the imposition by a Christian world of virtually unmitigated torment on
the negligible minority of Jews wherever they lived; the un-Christian
posture of Christendom; and the abysmal failure to communicate with
the other because the other is either “insider” or “outsider.”
How, then, do we determine if The Merchant of Venice is a play that
flawlessly exemplifies and, at the same time, peerlessly accentuates
the playwright’s power of negative capability, convincing us that the
anti-Jewish world that Shakespeare created is independent of its creator? We first examine his sources to determine what is original and
inventive in Shakespeare’s adaptation of two, perhaps three, old tales.
Probable Sources
One of the most fruitful questions we can ask is this: When we examine all the sources that Shakespeare used for his plays, what is there
in his drama – his plots and personalities – that is categorically different from anything that appears in the various sources he used?
An invaluable work for students of Shakespeare is the multi-volume
collection of Shakespeare’s sources edited by Geoffrey Bullough. There
are others, but his is the most nearly complete. When we study one
play, The Merchant of Venice for example, it is helpful to go back to
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the sources that Shakespeare used to see how he transformed them
– what he eliminated and what he added – as he wove them into the
texture of his own creative work. How he refashioned stories and characters tells us a great deal about what he was trying to do because, by
comparison, we can see what he decided to emphasize and highlight
and what he decided to ignore. We can also see what parts and personalities of a play are altogether new – what Shakespeare himself
created. By inference, then, we may have a good idea of what he was
striving to communicate. And so it is a worthwhile exercise to start
with the sources of The Merchant of Venice.
The most direct source, albeit in a more generalized way than earlier
sources, for some plot ideas, character portrayals, and situations is
Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta, which was produced just a
few years prior to the production of Shakespeare’s play. It would seem
that Shakespeare actually saw the play; certainly he read it and was
influenced by it, as we will examine later. But other indispensable
influences on the development of The Merchant of Venice seem to be
Ser Giovanni’s Il Pecorone, Gesta Romanorum, the 14th Novellino by
Massuccio, and The Jew of Malta by Marlowe. There are other possible
sources worth examining.
Il Pecorone (The Simpleton). Written in the fourteenth century by Ser
Giovanni Fiorentino and published in 1558 in Milan.
Although the flesh-bond story has been traced to the Indian Mahabarata(ca. 300 B.C.), similarities of incident and even identical
language indicate that Shakespeare was thoroughly familiar with
Fiorentino’s version of the story; for example:
The Merchant of Venice (MV) and Il Pecerone (IP) -- Comparisons and
Contrasts
MV: When Portia enters the courtroom scene, the Duke commands
Antonio and Shylock to “stand forth.”
IP: The lawyer desires the Jew to “stand forth” before allowing the
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forfeiture.
**
MV: In the same scene, Portia urges Shylock to take the money and
“bid me tear the bond.”
IP: After being judged, the Jew “tore in pieces the bond.”
**
MV: Antonio says, “Pray God Bassanio come to see me pay his debt,
and then I care not.”
IP: Ansaldo says to Gianneto, “I may see you before I die—then I will
depart content.
**
MV: Portia: “If you cut’st more or less than a just pound…thou diest.”
IP: The Lady of Belmonte: “Your paper makes no mention of the shedding of blood, but says expressly that you may take a pound of flesh.
Neither more nor less, and if I see one drop of blood more, off goes
your head.”
**
MV: Shylock says, “I am content” in his utter defeat as he leaves the
stage, never tobe seen again.
IP: The Jew says, “I am content,” anticipating that the court will award
him his ducats.                                                                              
**
In this story, which contains over 30 resemblances to Shakespeare’s
play, an unnamed Jew lends money to a Christian and demands a
pound of flesh as repayment. Bindo is a Florentine merchant whose
youngest son is Giannetto. On his deathbed, Bindo tells Giannetto to

Winter/Spring 2008 no. 68 | 33
join his wealthy Christian godfather Ansaldo (who corresponds to Antonio) in Venice to seek his fortune. In Venice, he decides to take one
of Ansaldo’s ships to woo the coveted lady of Belmonte. An incautious
and prodigal young man, Giannetto demolishes a couple of ships, but
still asks Ansaldo for another one. Now Ansaldo must borrow money
to provide Giannetto with a ship. He “went to a Jew of Mestri and
borrowed [10,000 ducats] on condition that if they were not repaid the
next June on St. John’s day, the [nameless] Jew might take a pound of
flesh from whatever part of his body he pleased. Ansaldo agreed, and
the Jew had a bond drawn up and witnessed with all necessary form
and ceremony.” After providing Giannetto with another ship, Ansaldo
said to him: “My son, you are going and know the bond to which I
agreed, I beseech you if misfortune comes to you that you will be
pleased to return so that I may see you before I die–then I will depart content.”   Although Giannetto won the beautiful and rich lady of
Belmonte, Ansaldo’s debt was not repaid on the day it was due. When
he could repay the Jew, the latter refused anything but the pound of
flesh. The Jew’s motive was solely his craving for a pound of Christian
flesh. The nameless lady of Belmonte, disguised as a lawyer, went to
court to defend Giannetto and tricked the Jew by saying: “If you take
more or less than a pound [of flesh], I shall have your head struck off.
Moreover, I tell you that if one drop of blood is spilled, I shall have you
put to death, for your bond does not mention the shedding of blood.”  
The Jew unavailingly demanded his money and, “seeing he could not
do what he had wished, [he] took the bond and tore it in pieces in a
fury. “ This part of the story is followed by the sub-plot of the “lawyer”
asking Giannetto for the ring that his fair lady gave him. The most obvious difference between Giovanni’s story and Shakespeare’s rendition
is motive – a critical distinction.
In the original, the motive is the desire to kill a Christian simply because he is a Christian.   But Shylock has no such motive. When he
refers to the pound of flesh as a “merry sport” for guaranteeing the
loan, there is no possibility that this practical man thought that Antonio could possibly be ruined and incapable of repaying the loan. For
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there to be storms on seven seas and for these storms to occur exactly
at the spot where Antonio’s ships were located are as conceivable as
winning the lottery. For Shylock, the forfeit of flesh was a sport, nothing more. In addition, Shylock’s disagreeable and painful dealings with
Antonio are entirely missing in the original. Harry Golden remarked
that “Shakespeare was the first writer in 700 years who gave the Jew
a motive.” (Gross 1992, p. 27)
Gesta Romanorum (1577, revised in 1595): A collection of stories
including that of “The Three Caskets” (called “Vessels” in this version).
It is here that Shakespeare finds the segment of his play about the
three caskets.   The Emperor of Rome showed the three vessels, as
they are called, to the daughter of the King of Ampluy who wanted
her to marry the Emperor’s son. Within the first vessel, made of gold,
were dead men’s bones with this inscription engraved on the front:
“Whoso chooseth me shall find what he deserveth.” The second vessel, made of silver, filled with earth and worms, bore the inscription:
“Whoso chooseth me shall find what his nature desireth.” The third
vessel was made of lead, filled with precious stones, and the inscription read: “Whoso chooseth me shall find what God hath disposed for
him.” Since God never disposed of harm, the princess chose the lead
vessel. The Emperor said: “Dear daughter, because you have wisely
chosen you shall wed my son.”
Il Novellino : An Italian novel by Masuccio of Salerno, writing around
1470. This may be the source of the critically important Jessica-Lorenzo elopement story although no Elizabethan translation is known.
A Neapolitan cavalier named Giuffredi Saccano was riding on horseback when he saw a young woman named Carmosina. When they
looked at each other, a sudden passion inflamed both of them for one
another. Inquiring about her and her parentage, Giuffredi learned that
she was the daughter of an “old man inordinately jealous and avaricious.” He also learned that this miser kept his daughter locked up
to keep suitors away. Contriving to get near to Carmosina, Giuffredi
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would buy different merchandise from the merchant and bring some of
his friends to be customers as well. As a result, the merchant allowed
a friendship to develop. Then, continuing with his plan, Guifreddi
asked the miser two things: if he would keep his slave girl Anna for a
while so that he could take a trip home and for a loan of 30 ducats.
The miser was happy to oblige and Anna entered the miser’s home.
She befriended Carmosina and told her of Guiffredi’s plan to hide in
a house next door and Anna would sneak her out of her own house
to rendevous with Giuffredi. Carmosina was thrilled and also “made
up her mind to abstract from the store of her avaricious old father a
much greater sum of money, about 1500 ducats, than anyone could
have reckoned sufficient for her dowry.” They slipped quietly out of
the house and met the cavalier who took her to a nearby island where
they were profoundly happy. They married and she had a child. Eventually they returned to Naples and the “foolish old man atoned for the
deed after all the damage had been done.”
It may be that Shakespeare also got the idea of the Jessica segment
from Marlowe’s depiction of Barabas and his daughter Abigail’s attitude
toward him in The Jew of Malta. In addition to the relational conflicts,
Abigail also throws a bag of jewels from a window. Barabas and Shylock have only one child each, and their children are both in love with
Christians. Other than these rather nebulous similarities, the use of
the daughter segment is radically different in Shakespeare’s rendition.
Jessica’s character and deeds – her devious departure and betrayal
of her father, the reckless spending, her greed and irresponsibility,
her motives for deserting Judaism and converting to Christianity, her
prevarications and insecurities in a Christian environment--are entirely
Shakespeare’s creation.
The following sources may have been familiar to Shakespeare, but
there is no clear documentation.
Speculative Sources
The Ballad of Gernutus: (Undated but written during the Renais-
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sance)
This is the introductory quote: “Showing the cruelty of Gernutus, a Jew
who, lending to a merchant 100 crowns, would have a pound of flesh,
because the merchant couldn’t pay him at the day appointed.”
The story then continues: “In Venice a cruel Jew dwelt who lived on
usury,” thinking of how to deceive the poor. A merchant of great fame
who lived in the city wanted to help his friend. Gernutus said if he
couldn’t pay it back, he would have a pound of his flesh as the bond.
When the merchant’s ships did not return on the day the loan was
due; Gernutus had him incarcerated and demanded his bond. Weeping friends came to plead with Gernutus and offered him money, but
Gernutus said, “I will no gold, my forfeit I will have.” The judge tried to
persuade him, but he insisted on the pound of flesh. “The bloody Jew”
took “whetted blade in hand.” As he was about to cut, the judge said:
“You must not shed a drop of blood.” Gernutus then said he would
take the money instead, but now the judge refused. The Jew then
departed. In closing the author says: “Many a wretch as ill as he still
lives among us presently. May God deliver every Christian from such a
wretch.”
The Orator by Alexander Silvayn (1596)
Silvayn sets up his story as a debate between a nameless Jew and a
Christian merchant who borrowed 900 crowns. The contract stated
that if he didn’t pay by a certain date, he would have to give the Jew
a pound of his own flesh. The Jew refused to take money, demanding
the flesh instead. Then the judge ordered that only a pound could be
cut, and if he cut any more or any less, he would be executed himself.
The Jew speaks first in court and argues that contracts are broken to
the detriment of the Commonwealth. Actually, other penalties are crueler such as incarceration and slavery, which is practiced even among
Christians. Perhaps having a pound of flesh cut is preferable to being
imprisoned or enslaved. The breach of his promise also cost the Jew
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a great deal in terms of the integrity of his credit. The pound of flesh
may also be necessary as a deterrent to terrify Christians for abusing
Jews. But the most important reason is that he owes it to the Jew –
the reason actually needed. In addition, the Jew can cut the pound
from whichever part of his body will cause the least pain and sacrifice.
The Christian replies: What possible reason could the Jew have for
demanding flesh other than the “ancient and cruel hate” that he bears
to Christians and all other non-Jews? The Christian believes that the
Jew has caused the delay in the Christian’s receiving his money so that
he could have the pound of flesh. He also asserts that Jews do this sort
of thing to “offend our God whom they have crucified. Why? Because
he was holy.” Even the Bible says they are a rebellious people, and
God dispersed them because of their sins. Therefore, states the Christian, what can we possibly expect of them now since they neither have
their faith nor their law – only their “rapines and usuries.” Finally, the
Christian hopes the judge will deliver him “from this monster’s cruelty.”
Zelauto by Anthony Munday (1580), subtitled: “The amorous life of
Strabino a scholar, the brave behavior of Rodolfo a martial gentleman,
and the right reward of Signor Truculento, a usurer.”
Truculento wants to marry Cornelia, but Strabino and she are in love
with each other. Cornelia’s father promised her to Truculento. Cornelia
devises a plan to deceive her father so she can marry Strabino.
The story also contains the bond of flesh plot because Truculento, who
is never identified as Jewish, lent money to Strabino and his friend
Rodolfo who also is in love with Brisana.
Sir Vincentio of Pescara sent his son Strabino to an academy in Verona for his education. Soon he developed a friendship with Rodolfo
who was primarily interested in “martial exercises” rather than in his
studies. Rodolfo had a sister, Cornelia, who was very attractive. Cornelia did not encourage his love for her and he was melancholy with
love-sickness. He and Rodolfo soon set out for Rodolfo’s father’s house.
His name was Signor Cioralamo Ruscelli. But Cornelia had another
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suitor, Signor Truculento, “an extorting usurer.” Truculento came to the
house and offered Ruscelli a costly cup containing 500 crowns. Ruscelli
responded favorably and called for his daughter. When learning the
reason, she responded: “Will you for money marry me to a miser?
Will you for riches have so little regard for me?” Feeling spurned,
Truculento departed just as Strabino and Rodolfo were approaching the
house.
When Strabino and Cornelia were together, she pledged herself to
him and they sealed their love with a kiss. Then Cornelia conceived
of a plan to deceive her father so she could marry Strabino instead of
Truculento. She told them both to go to Truculento’s house and borrow
enough money to purchase a certain jewel that Ruscelli had wanted.
They went to Truculento’s house flattering him enough to gain the
loan. But Truculento said that if they didn’t pay it back by a certain
day both of them would lose their right eyes. They agreed and receive
4000 ducats.
As they were going to purchase the jewel, Rodolfo confided in his
friend that he was in love with Brisana, Truculento’s daughter. They
brought the jewel to Ruscelli and Strabino became engaged to Cornelia.
Then the friends went to Truculento’s house, and Brisana opened
the door. They expressed their love for each other and, unknown to
Truculento, Ruscelli married the couples. When Truculento found out
about this, he was “bereft of his wits” and swore revenge. The next
day, he forced Strabino and Rodolfo to appear before a judge. When
they found out about it, Cornelia and Brisana disguised themselves as
scholars of the law and appeared before the court.
Truculento told the judge that they had missed the deadline for paying
the debt and now he didn’t want the money anyway. Instead they
must lose their right eyes “for falsifying their faith.” The judge then
advised them to be as impartial as possible and called on Strabino to
present his case.
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Strabino then spoke, referring to Truculento as a “caterpillar” and
“worm of the world.” He said they were only two days late and were
willing to compensate Truculento accordingly.
The judge then said that Strabino’s offer of paying more than he owes
because of his delay was reasonable and asked Truculento to accept
this.
Truculento then replied that he only wanted his bond and asked for no
more than the friends deserve. He said: “I crave justice to be uprightly
used and I crave no more; therefore I will have it.”
The judge responded that they had to honor Truculento’s demand. Rodolfo then spoke, saying that they were foolish to expect anything else
from such a cut-throat and wretch. The judge called on their attorneys
to speak in their behalf.
Brisana was first, arguing that if she went to pay back the loan and
the creditor was nowhere to be found, she could not be faulted if she
didn’t pay it back on the date it was due. She further argued that
Truculento made himself absent maliciously on purpose.
Truculento defended himself by saying that even though he was away,
his house was not empty. His receiver, in his absence, represents him.
Cornelia, disguised, argued that Truculento could have the eyes, but
spilling one drop of blood from their eyes was not part of the bond,
and if he should spill any blood then both his eyes must be removed.
The judge agreed.
Truculento was furious, and asked for his money instead. But the
judge said that since he didn’t take it when it was offered, the money
would not be given now. Truculento then accepted Rodolfo as his lawful
son and put him in possession of all his earnings. Then everyone was
“content.”
The Jew, referred to by Stephen Gosson in his pamphlet The School of
Abuse (1579).
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While this play is not extant, Shakespeare could have been familiar
with it. As Gross says, Stephen Gosson in School of Abuse “praised it
for the seriousness with which it laid bare ‘the greediness of worldly
choosers and the bloody minds of usurers.’ This has sometimes
been interpreted in terms of the two main strands in The Merchant of
Venice with the bloody-minded usurer representing an early version
of Shylock, and the worldly choosers foreshadowing Portia’s rejected
suitors....” (Gross 1992, p. 17) Therefore this seems to be the only
play prior to Shakespeare’s that combined the story of Shylock and the
story of the caskets into one play. It may have given Shakespeare the
idea of weaving the two components into one play.
Taking into account the general sources above, what did Shakespeare
very likely borrow?
* The pound of flesh story
* A woman lawyer, disguised, in court
* The Jewish moneylender
* The contractual prohibition against spilling blood
* The presentation of arguments in court
* The rebellious daughter escaping from an avaricious father, eloping
with her lover and
stealing from her father.
* Three caskets or vessels with inscriptions for making the choice of an
ideal woman.
* Lead as the right metal of choice.
And What Did Shakespeare Invent?
* Shylock’s three-dimensional personality
* Cumulative motives for the pound of flesh that are elaborately delineated. Shakespeare made sure, convincingly, that we could empathize
with the depths of his motivation and believe that Shylock, given the
weight of physical and emotional injury, was justified.
* The avarice and treachery of his daughter and her new husband
* The human dimensions of Shylock’s speech on the humanity of a
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Jew, his courageous utterance on slavery, the stinging grief he feels in
response to the loss of his late wife’s ring, the apostasy of his daughter, the trickery of the Christians who invited him to dinner only to use
the opportunity to aid Jessica in her escape, and his own forced and
completely arbitrary conversion.
* The implacable abusiveness of the non-Jews in Shylock’s world.
* The plethora of character flaws in every person with whom Shylock
has a relationship.
* The moral discrepancies between what people say and what they do.
* The incongruities between outer appearance and inner substance,
symbolized by the caskets.
* Everyone is as materialistic as Shylock ; they all have a reverential
loyalty to Mammon.
* Jewish-Christian tensions in the Jacob-Laban dialogue and in the
slavery monologue, embodied in the antagonism between Shylock and
Antonio. Excluding the trial scene, all else is Shakespeare’s invention
with Shylock and Antonio as foils to each other.
On the basis of what Shakespeare creates, then, it is reasonable
to conclude that the playwright examined many sources, including
Marlowe’s play, and transformed the conventional and historically
stereotypical portrayal of the Jew as transparent and thoroughgoing
villain into an unappealing human being who combined both foibles
and virtues, tenderness and cruelty – but, above all, a person who was
wrongfully abused, humiliated, and aggrieved by his contemporaries;
and beyond his own time and place, suffering also from the torment of
his people’s history.
2. ALL THAT GLISTERS
Although the focus of criticism and analysis has been on Shylock,
it is important for our understanding of the play to note that every
character is conspicuously flawed. Like the caskets, each one has an
outer personality which barely conceals an inner character of extensive
imperfection. This places everyone in the same ship of shortcomings
with Shylock, reminding us of what Portia herself says: “To do and to
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know what were good to do are quite different.” (1.2.11) Just as the
New Testament is intended to be the fulfillment of the Old Testament,
transcending the values of the Old, so, in their behavior as well as
in their beliefs, Christians are supposed to surpass what Shylock
represents. Unfortunately, they don’t. “No relationship is without an
edge, no jest without at least a tinge of hostility, no virtue without
self-interest.” (Wheeler 1991, p. xiii) In addition, Shakespeare dissects every expression of anti-Jewishness through his characters from
the “mild” prejudice of Bassanio to the violent tone of Gratiano’s verbal
eruptions.
Let’s see if the shortcomings of each character are textually verifiable.
Lorenzo: Fit for treasons
Heinrich Heine wrote: “As to Lorenzo, he is an accomplice in a most
infamous robbery by which according to Prussian law he would be condemned to fifteen years’ penal servitude after being branded and put
in the pillory, although he had a liking for the beauties of nature, for
moonlight scenes and music as well as for jewels and ducats.” (Scott
1992, p. 200)
Lorenzo says to his new wife that individuals who dislike music are “fit
for treasons, stratagems, and spoils.” (5.1.85) No one is guiltier of all
three shortcomings than Lorenzo. For treason, he betrays Shylock, his
new father-in-law. His stratagem is outwitting Shylock of his money.
The spoils are Shylock’s money, jewels, and daughter.
In his Pythagorean speeches, he says that music makes everything
orderly and harmonious (5.1)   But his words are filled with contradictions between philosophical theory and his own behavior.
His interest in money is consistent and persistent. Nerissa tells him
about Shylock’s forced deed of giving his fortune after death to the
couple, and Lorenzo replies: “Fair ladies, you drop manna in the way of
starved people.” (5.1.290f) But why are Lorenzo and Jessica starved
after stealing so much from Shylock? They are perfect examples of
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“youthful and unhandled colts” whose blood is in a “hot condition,”
thus contradicting Lorenzo’s own reflections.
The two of them, Lorenzo and Jessica, share a “love that is lawless
financed by theft and engineered through a gross breach of trust. It is
subjected to no test....The ring which ought to seal their love is traded
for a monkey. They are spendthrift rather than liberal, thoughtless
squanderers of stolen substance; they are aimless, drifting by chance
from Venice to Genoa to Belmont...attended by a low-grade clown,
who fathers illegitimate children.” (Burckhardt 1968, p. 224)
Gratiano: An infinite deal of nothing
Gratiano admits he can play a fool (1.1), which he certainly does in
the trial scene. He admits that he talks too much, which he certainly
does, also in the trial scene. Lorenzo confirms this when he says that
“Gratiano never lets me speak.”(1.1) Bassanio corroborates it and
adds to loquacity that “Gratiano speaks an infinite deal of nothing...
his reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff: you
shall seek all day ere you find them, and when you have them, they
are not worth the search.”(1.1)
He is the only character in the play who uses vulgarities, the most
boorish being the very last line of the play with “ring” referring to “vulva.” A question often asked, but unanswered, is a simple one: Why
should the most uncouth individual in the play be given the final line?
Gratiano continually interrupts the proceedings in court with pugnacious remarks, representing the bigot who can easily cross the line
from verbal abuse to violence, personifying the dangerous stereotypes
of Jews harbored by Christian communities for centuries.
Bassanio lets Gratiano know it: “Thou art too wild, too rude, and bold
of voice [with] wild behavior.” (2.2)
In court, Gratiano compares the gallows to the baptismal font. His
most brutal and vulgar anti-Semitism “is the keynote of a whole chorus of anti-Jewish abuse in which many other voices joined: a chorus
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in which the leitmotif is ‘dog’ and its variations.” (Fiedler in Bloom
1986, p. 70) In brief, he is the voice of anti-Semitic psychology.
Gratiano’s remarks about the relationship of Pythagoreanism to the
immortality of an animal’s soul bring to mind his own animalistic behavior which borders on savagery.
He also talks about acting the perfect hypocrite (2.2.180ff); at least
he is honest about his own hypocrisy, especially since his behavior is
completely at odds with what the “observance of civility” means to
him; namely, sober habits, prayer books, saying grace, and respecting
older generations. (2.2.177)
Launcelot Gobbo and Father: Truth will out
The clown deceives his blind father, but complains that his master
Shylock doesn’t feed him enough. Is he creditable if he can deceive
his own blind father? Incidentally, did Shakespeare intend to create an
analogy here between Launcelot and his blind father on one hand, and
Jacob and his blind father Isaac (especially since Jacob is prominently
featured in the play)?
Launcelot undermines household decorum, evidently imposing his own
personality where it does not belong relative to his employment. He
also impregnates a Moorish woman (2.2.32-95, 5.7-9; 3.5.26f, 33-38).
All told, Launcelot is an unsavory, unattractive character, not to be
found in any of the sources, completely invented by Shakespeare.
The Duke of Venice: He shall do this, or else
The arbiter of Venetian justice is hardly neutral in the commencement
of proceedings in the court of justice when he speaks about Shylock to
Antonio:
“I am sorry for thee. Thou art come to answer
A stony adversary, an inhuman wretch,
Uncapable of pity, void and empty
From any dram of mercy.” (4.1.3f)
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He also appeals to the values of “human gentleness and love,” while
at the same time displaying the very opposite by focusing on Shylock
as an outsider and a pariah. He speaks about Antonio’s bad luck by
expecting “commiseration of his state from brassy bosoms and rough
hearts of flint, from stubborn Turks and Tartars never train’d to offices
of tender courtesy.” (4.1.29f) Various ethnic groups evidently do not
have the training in sensitivity that Christians do; Jews are included in
such bosoms and hearts.
Bassanio: To shoot another arrow
The first thing we learn about Portia from Bassanio is that she is a
wealthy woman. (1.1.161) His materialism shines vividly with statements about love that are filled with words like gold, worth, value,
and thrift. We also learn that he is prodigal, reckless with money
borrowed, and in great debt. (1.1.128) He only gets out of trouble
because of Portia’s wealth and Antonio’s willingness to risk his life to
help his best friend.
Because of his debts, marrying Portia will free him from his “chief
care” (1.1.127f) – his financial liabilities.   Bassanio, however, has his
moments of hypocrisy, especially when he says: “...gaudy gold....I will
none of thee;” except, of course, for Antonio’s, Shylock’s, and Portia’s
willingness to provide him with his pecuniary needs and desires. “The
world is still deceiv’d with ornament,” he says (3.2), but he brings
“gifts of rich value” anyway in order to win Portia. (2.9.91). Bassanio
may be the least unattractive of all the characters, surely the least
anti-Jewish. But his integrity is questionable, borrowing repeatedly
without repaying his debtor.
Portia: Aweary of this great world
The first words we hear from our heroine is that she is “aweary of this
great world.” (2.1)
Nerissa, her “waiting-woman,” tries to analyze this weariness by saying that Portia “surfeits with too much” (1.2.5), and then offers her
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Aristotelian advice to assuage Portia’s sense of ennui by applying the
golden mean instead of living excessively: “It is no mean happiness,
therefore, to be seated in the mean....”
The Prince of Morocco leaves Portia’s home after choosing the wrong
casket in his attempt to win her hand. Her response is, “To offend and
judge are distinct offices (2.9.61),”
which is precisely what she does in the trial scene where she acts as
both judge and prosecutor.
There she has “decreed” that Shylock is wrong and Antonio is right before listening and understanding both sides in spite of her words about
looking at every moral issue within its contextual situation: “Nothing
is good, I see, without respect....How many things by season season’d
are to their right praise and true perfection!” (5.1.99, 107f)
Portia is relieved after the Moor chooses the wrong casket, but not for
a reason we want to hear from a heroine: "Let all of his complexion
choose me so." (2.7.79) That is, let all people of dark skin choose a
rotting skull!   This comes after Morocco says: "Mislike me not for my
complexion." [2.l l] And Portia does.
She also mixes religion with her prejudice in saying: “If he have the
condition of a saint and the complexion of a devil, I had rather he
should shrive me than wive me.” (1.2.123f) But she also reveals her
hypocrisy in response to his hope that she will not “mislike” him for his
“complexion,” when she responds that he stands “as fair as any
comer.” (2.20f). So from the heroine herself we discover the first
indications of racial bigotry in the play. Portia makes external judgments–evaluating others by their surface appearance...instead of what
is beneath, thereby living her own words:    “If to do were as easy
as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and
poor men’s cottages princes’ palaces,–it is a good divine that follows
his own instructions,–I can easier teach twenty what were good to
be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching: the
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brain may devise laws for the blood, but a hot temper leaps o’er a cold
decree....” (1.2.12f) – words that certainly augur her demeanor in the
trial scene in the incongruity between her words about mercy and her
consequent actions.
It is important to compare her intolerance to the racism in Othello, and
ask ourselves: Because Othello is filled with statements of racial bigotry, was the author a racist? We will examine this question later, but
it should be at least mentioned here because Shakespeare has been
accused of being anti-Semitic.
Portia, in fact, generalizes about other individuals also. She is scornful
of the foreigner who is interested in horses, the one who drinks, the
one who will be affectatious, the one who is dumb–all based not on
their unique individuality but on national-ethnic stereotyping.
Portia manipulates Bassanio into choosing the right casket. Her deception in hinting at which casket Bassanio should choose also goes
against her sacred vow to her dead father. Thus Jessica’s betrayal of
Shylock parallels Portia’s betrayal of her father.
To get Bassanio to choose the right casket, she uses the word "hazard”
[3.2.l], which is linked to the Leaden Casket: "who chooseth me must
give and hazard all he hath" (2.7.9), and then she arranges a song to
be sung while Bassanio is trying to make a decision about which casket
to select. The song contains words rhyming with lead: "d. bred, head,
nourishe" (3.2.63)
Caskets themselves may be a metaphor to help us understand a partial meaning of the play – a meaning that is actually articulated more
than once: We must look underneath, not on the surface for understanding.
Portia rhapsodizes about mercy in one of Shakespeare’s most beautiful speeches, but she applies excessive justice (still another expression of excess which Nerissa observes to be Portia’s primary problem
in being “aweary of this great world”).   In the courtroom, mercy
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becomes irrelevant as it is sacrificed for justice beyond any reasonable
or humane measure. Her beautiful speech on mercy patently “does
not teach us all” to be merciful. She shows this discrepancy in saying
that the Jew must be merciful. Even Shylock doesn’t understand the
coupling of the words “mercy” and “must.” Mercy is spontaneous,
natural, self-motivated – there is no must about it. In fact, when Portia
demands mercy, Shylock already knows what is to follow; that he is
condemned even before the sentence is declared. “Must” is the key
that the conclusion of the trial will be “all justice” and no mercy.
In the courtroom, as we move through Portia’s control of the situation
from mercy to severe legality, Portia says:
"...there is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established.
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many in error by the same example
Will rush into the state. It cannot be."
There is no more talk of mercy; now it is justice, pure and simple....
and then, even beyond justice when she says to Shylock:
"...as thou urgest justice, be assured
Thou shalt have justice more than thou desir'st." (4.l.315)
Shylock is now willing to accept three times the amount of his bond,
but not Portia: "The Jew shall have all justice. Soft, no haste! He shall
have nothing but the penalty." (4.l.320)
Shylock: "Give me my principal and let me go."
Portia: "He shall have merely justice and his bond."
Shylock: "Shall I not have barely my principal?"
Portia: "Thou shalt have nothing but the forfeiture."
As he prepares to leave, she says: "Tarry, Jew: The law hath yet another hold on you."
So Shylock demands that the bond be taken literally just as it was
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signed and notarized. But Portia insists that it be taken even more
literally, and says: "Down therefore and beg mercy of the Duke."
What does justice have to do with forcing him to the floor? In this
action, there is hardly the remotest resemblance to the quality that
drops like the gentle rain from heaven. Mercy proves completely irrelevant to the real situation. What an enormous gap between ideal and
reality! Portia’s insistence on “all justice” seems to refer to applying
a law to Shylock which had no right of application in this case, taking
from Shylock all his possessions, and exhorting his soul.
“All justice” means that the enforcement of the forfeited bond which
was declared legal was then turned against Shylock, putting him into a
position of being unable to object to anything the “court” decides to do
against him, including the termination of life itself. Had the complaint
been nullified, then Shylock would not be able to collect the loan on
the strength of the bond. But they went far beyond this to the question
of executing him.   This so-called law that they were about to put into
effect does not even apply to Shylock on the basis of the law that was
legally applicable.
Venetian society appears to permit Shylock a legal standing, and
yet the legal protection that is supposedly his is undermined by the
process of one law subverting another. Earlier, he said to the Duke:
“What judgment shall I dread, doing no wrong?” (89) When a confounded Shylock moves from saying “I stand here for law” (142) to “Is
this the law?” (309), he reveals his shocked recognition that the law as
now applied to him – the Jew, the stranger, the alien, the outsider -is a sham. When Portia, the Duke, and Antonio mete out sentences of
“all justice,” with Gratiano bellowing in the background, it is remindful
of Cicero’s famous adage: summum jus, summa injuria – “extreme
justice is extreme injury [or extreme injustice].”   For Shylock to receive “all justice,” (4.1.417) he must receive “nothing but the penalty,”
which happens to be “extreme justice” or injury.
When Portia demands that Shylock bow down to the Duke, she is
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also forcing him to engage in a gesture violative of Judaism. The
tradition is that one bows only in the presence of God, not before any
human. This is one of the essential messages of the biblical story of
Esther, Mordecai, and Haman. But it goes further. What does bowing
signify? If I feel a sense of wonder, awe, reverence, I may feel the
need to pay respect and homage. It is the religious sense–what Sam
Keen calls the “sixth sense”–that I am in the presence of something
“wonder-ful.” And it is natural for me to bow in homage before some
presence or some phenomenon that I consider so filled with wonder
that it is “sacred.” For the Jew, only God is sacred; not a duke or king
or president. Portia’s demand, once again, is hardly merciful or even
sensitive.
Is it also the law that a counterfeit judge in disguise forges papers and
then conducts a trial without that trial being declared null and void-not only a mistrial but a non-trial, a travesty of justice with punishment perforce meted out to the pretender, forger and perjurer in the
court?
Because of these decisions and behaviors, Bassanio’s words become
oracular: “In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt but, being season’d with a gracious voice, obscures the show of evil?” (3.2.75f) The
most fundamental issue that makes the trial fraudulent is a basic principle of jurisprudence. To take a pound of flesh, Portia reminds Shylock, he must not cut an ounce more nor an ounce less than a pound,
“in the estimation of a hair;” neither must he shed one drop of blood.
It is simply erroneous, of course, that a creditor might be punished
for taking less than what he is entitled to by law. The axiom is that in
order to execute a legally admissible action (cutting a pound of flesh)
its natural and inevitable consequences (such as bleeding) are also
legally admissible. If a pound of flesh is excised (a legal act according
to the notarized bond), then blood must flow (also legal, therefore,
because it is unavoidable in order to realize the penalty).. Here is
where the whole process in the courtroom breaks down, invalidating
the trial and trivializing justice itself.   Adapting the story he inherited,
Shakespeare was exposing the entire charade of jurisprudence in this
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kangaroo court.
If the playwright himself was committed to the very purpose of drama
spoken by Hamlet to the actors, then he must have wanted this distortion and twisting of justice to be shown “her own image.” The image
here is of individuals who believe in one form of justice for themselves
and another altogether for the mere alien or outsider. Instead of a
court of law, Shylock is sequestered in an enemy camp of vigilantes.
Furthermore, is there an ironic relationship between Portia’s mercy
speech and her words about being reimbursed for her “professional”
services? “My mind was never yet more mercenary.” (4.1.414) Why
did Shakespeare use the word “mercenary” if not to see the contradictory relationship to mercy in Portia’s speech and in her behavior? We
have heard about mercy, but what we have experienced is a mercenary subversion of mercy. Portia’s behavior is mercenary more than it
is merciful.
“...it is Portia who fails Shylock,” Harold Goddard argues, “not Shylock
Portia. The same thing happens to her that happened to him at that
other supreme moment when he offered Antonio the loan without
interest. Her antipodal self emerges....Her ‘therefore, Jew’ gives an
inkling of what is coming. You can hear, even in the printed text, the
change of voice, as Portia sinks from compassion to legality....” (1951,
pp. 106-107)
This change is also manifest in the fact that Shylock never knows that
Balthazar is really Portia. But is strict, literal justice really a disguise,
or is it the real Portia while the mask is worn for the speech on mercy?  
Is it just another depiction of the contemptuous treatment by Christians of the Jew in contrast to the engaging friendship and compassion
exchanged exclusively among themselves? Then we hear Shylock's
heart-broken words: "I pray you give me leave to go from hence. I
am not well." (395)
Portia's speech did not teach her to be compassionate, again reminding us of her own words: "I can easier teach twenty what were good
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to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching."
l.2.l2-l7. Indeed, there may have been twenty individuals in the
courtroom when she taught about mercy, but failed to follow her own
lesson. In fact, Portia insists that Shylock not only accept the verdict
but do so with gratification: “Art thou contented, Jew? What dost thou
say?” (4.1.388)
As the trial scene is a satire on a court of justice, Portia’s speech on
mercy is also a satire in terms of her own hypocrisy in demanding
more than justice. It turns out to be nothing more than the exertion
of power by the insiders against the ultimate impotence of the outsider, having nothing to do with justice or due process or the evidentiary
standards of a court trial.
Furthermore, the courtroom becomes linked to the casket story
through the behavior of the principal characters. Recall the essence
of the inscription on the golden casket: More Than You Deserve. This
could possibly represent the negation of getting too much, and the
irony that the Jew will have more than justice – more than he really
deserves.
Portia also lies to Bassanio about her false identity as a lawyer, in
addition to lying about going to “live in prayer and contemplation...
until...my lord’s return.” She deceives him by asking, as Balthazar, for
the wedding ring (4.1.420f) in addition to being rigid and unsparing in
her literalness about the ring as a symbol of loyalty (3.2.436; 2.2.172;
5.1.226). Portia is not the person she pretends to be.
Antonio and Bassanio are in the very shadow of death, but she postpones the conclusion she is to present, keeping them in the throes of
anguish longer than necessary. What possessed her to torture Bassanio and Antonio with unnecessary suspense? There is no answer.
Antonio: Much ado to know myself
Richard Posner reminds us that “there is something...not altogether
wholesome about Antonio....in his joylessness, wifelessness, melan-
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choly, anti-Semitism, and essential solitariness, he is almost the Christian mirror of Shylock.” (1998, pp. 108-109)
We never find out the nature of his mysterious despondency referred
to in the opening lines of the play, but he must try to know himself, to
understand himself. Perhaps the next reference to sadness reveals the
answer as he swears by two-headed Janus (one head smiling and the
other frowning). Could the sadness stem from his Janus-like behavior
of love towards those who are like him and his hatred of Shylock who
is different -- the fact that he is capable of both love and hate at the
same time? (1.1.50) Maybe he’s the real fool because he “pries not
to the interior” of himself. (2.9.27) In fact, Antonio says, “O what a
goodly outside falsehood hath!” (1.3.97)   But it requires considerable
work, sometimes painful work, to be true to oneself.
Antonio relentlessly abuses Shylock with epithets, showing his pure
hatred. Shylock says that Antonio spat on him, spurned him, and
called him a dog. It is difficult to imagine a good “gentleman” kicking
and spitting on any human being. Antonio replies: “I am like to call
thee so again, to spit on thee again, to spurn thee also.” He is the
only one in the play who actually uses physical abuse as well as verbal
abuse.
Nor can he believe that the Jew could be kind and says: “Hie thee,
gentle Jew [perhaps a pun on gentile], the Hebrew will turn Christian,
he grows kind.” (3.2.174) Are Christians the only ones who can be
kind? Does this good person really believe this? It would seem so
since, later, he stereotypes all Jews as callous: Nothing is harder than
a “Jewish heart” (4.1.78) – a generalization that had been around at
least since the time of Chaucer. In The Prioriess’s Tale, he refers to
“Satan who has his wasp’s nest in the Jewish heart.”
Antonio insists that the transaction with Shylock should be “one between enemies, so that, if I forfeit, you can exact the penalty with a
better conscience and so that I may retain my right to spit on you,”
although Shylock did say that he would like to be friends and take no
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interest from Antonio – just an outright loan with “no doit of usance for
my moneys.” (1.3.137f) Shylock’s offer of friendship is a powerful one
if friendship means the erasure of boundaries between two individuals.
Boundaries, however, have been a primary instrument for defining the
Jew and the Jew’s relationship to Christians. To be an enemy is, above
all, to persist in retaining boundaries. Shylock wants them dropped,
which is inconceivable to Antonio. One of the ways that Antonio understands his own Christian identity is through the ostracism of the
Jew. To be a Christian is not to be a Jew; hence, they must remain
enemies. Friendship in this community is friendship narrowly limited to
the community itself. Portia herself expresses this circumscribed idea
of friendship when she says: “...in companions that do converse and
waste the time together, whose souls do bear an equal yoke of love,
there must be needs a like proportion of lineaments, of manners, and
of spirit....” (3.4.10f)
The irony is that after being spat upon and kicked, Shylock is still willing to be Antonio’s friend, showing himself to be more “Christian” than
Antonio by his willingness to turn the other cheek and to enter into a
friendship with someone who is “different,” unlike him in many ways.
Portia’s words represent the sentiment of the community about friendship; it should be a “like proportion.”
Antonio is also hypocritical in his attitude toward usury, or interest-bearing loans. On the one hand, he is opposed to usury and
would “neither lend nor borrow by taking nor by giving of excess....”
(1.3.56f) That is his principle, but it is a principle that he also violates
by making an exception of borrowing for Bassanio. He resists usury on
principle except when it’s advantageous for him to suspend the principle. “...yet to supply the ripe wants of my friend,” says Antonio, “I’ll
break a custom.” (1.3.60) His inconsistency combined with self-rectitude must have been annoying to Shylock who says to him: “...
methoughts you said, you neither lend nor borrow upon advantage.”
And Antonio self-righteously replies: “I do never use it.” For Shylock,
“never” and “yet” appear to be mutually exclusive.

Winter/Spring 2008 no. 68 | 55
Antonio forces Shylock to convert to Christianity. Note that Antonio
uses the word “provided” in 4.1.382, implying “or else execution.”  
Antonio doesn’t give Shylock much of a choice: to convert or to die.
His ultimatum hardly manifests the quality of mercy dropping as the
gentle rain. In fact, one of the key words in the charming mercy
speech may be “strained.” Portia is saying that mercy can never be
strained. But Shylock does just that, at least he strains Portia’s sense
of mercy since she plans to outdo justice itself. If mercy is strained,
then, it must be something other than mercy. Her words become
contradictory (perhaps hypocritical?) within the courtroom scene.
Then, when Portia asks Antonio what mercy he can render, he replies:
"So please my lord the Duke and all the court
To quit the fine for one half of his goods,
I am content; so he will let me have
The other half in use, to render it
Upon his death unto the gentleman
That lately stole his daughter.
Two things provided more, that for this favor
He presently become a Christian;
The other, that he do record a gift,
Here in the court of all he dies possess'd
Unto his son Lorenzo and his daughter." (4.1.380f)
There is not the least tinge of mercy in this judgment – only the sternest kind of justice, that of retribution.
Perhaps Antonio seizes upon retribution for reasons other than the
fact that Shylock almost succeeded in killing him, which may be reason enough. This man who coercively imposes a change of religious
identity on “the Jew” is the same person who, shortly before this,
called himself a “tainted wether of the flock” (4.1.113) – possibly the
only male among his group of fellow-Christian men incapable of sexual
deftness, of seminal emission, of reproducing, of breeding in contrast
to the prolific mammals of Shylock’s biblical dialogue with Antonio.
Among other reasons, Antonio hates Shylock for the exuberance of his
sexual interpretation of the Jacob-Laban story. With no female com-
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panion, with a seemingly excessive love for Bassanio, and his melancholy in response to Bassanio’s departure for Belmont and Portia, Antonio’s “want-wit sadness” points to a problem of sexual disorientation,
possibly impotence, even asexuality. When Shylock is enmeshed in
Portia’s courtroom sophistry, Antonio’s opportunity arrives to compensate for his impotence and confusion by using the little power given
him in court to punish Shylock in a most injurious way. He must feel
an adrenal surge from robbing Shylock of his past, present, and future.
Antonio uses another form of murder for his revenge. “Hates any man
the thing he would not kill?” (4.1.66) Antonio hates Shylock’s Jewish
identity; the fortunate moment arrives to expunge it by mandatory
decree.
Become A Christian Or Else
Forced conversion, however, is a repudiation of Christian values (as are
other behaviors in the play) while, at the same time, as Freud points
out (21:132), it is a symbolic killing [by Christianity and Antonio] of
the religion of the father [Judaism and Shylock]. This may be the
meaning of that passage in which Bassanio reflects: “In religion, what
damned error but some sober brow will bless it and approve it with a
text, hiding the grossness with fair ornament?” (3.2.77f) What other
religion could he be referring to if not Christianity? Doesn’t Christianity, as manifest in the play, show the “damned error” of retribution
exacted by the Duke’s and Antonio’s vicious resolutions against Shylock, which contradicts the very principle of mercy, and even justice
itself? Is this “grossness” not hid with the “fair ornament” of Christian
triumphalism and self-rectitude?
In the sixth century, Pope Gregory I (590-604) declared Judaism to be
“a superstitious depravity,” but decreed that Jews should not be baptized by force: He clearly stated his argument against coercion: “....
when [a Jew] is brought to the font of baptism, not by the sweetness
of preaching but by compulsion, he returns to his former superstition,
and dies the worse from having been born again.” Gregory believed
that his teachers’ benevolence could accomplish much more than force
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so that “the mind of the convert returns not again to his former vomit
[and leads him] to the regeneration of a new life.”
Gregory’s position was reaffirmed in the twelfth century by St. Thomas
Aquinas who also asserted, however, that Jews were “doomed to perpetual servitude and the princes may regard the possessions of Jews
as belonging to the State...” After some time Aquinas’ position actually became law, evident from the words of a great English jurist, Henri
de Bracton: “The Jew cannot have anything of his own. Whatever he
acquires he acquires not for himself but for the king.”
Paul, in Romans 11, indicated that Jews can only be redeemed through
conversion. His argument, in sum, is this: Because of the iniquity of
Jews, God chose Gentiles for salvation. That would make Jews jealous;
they will want to be included in Christian salvation. Their inclusion will
mean “life from the dead.” They have fallen, but God has the power
to graft them in again. Paul, however, never asserted that conversion
should be coerced.
Antonio foreshadows his own coercive demand that Shylock convert
when he says: “The Hebrew will turn Christian: he grows kind.”
(1.3.175). In addition, Antonio knows the sanctity of the ring’s symbolism in Bassanio and Portia’s relationship, and yet he tries to persuade
Bassanio to give it up. (4.2.448ff.) Antonio violates the very values
he seemingly professes. So does every member of the Christian community. Things are not what they seem, whether we refer to casket or
Christian. Not one Christian is true to the values they profess. Their
behavior runs counter to their own Christian ideals.
A. D. Moody wrote: “To emphasize the importance and centrality of
the irony, I would suggest that the play is ‘about’ the manner in which
the Christians succeed in the world by not practicing their ideals of love
and mercy; that it is about their exploitation of an assumed unworldliness to gain the worldly advantage over Shylock; and that, finally it is
about the essential likeness of Shylock and his judges, whose triumph
is even more a matter of mercenary justice than his would have been.

58 | VCU Menorah Review
In this view the play does not celebrate the Christian virtues so much
as expose their absence.” (1964, p. 10)
Meyer Jack Landa agrees in writing that the play is “a scathing indictment of the Christianity of the day.” (1969, p. 78) Do the Christians
define themselves as a community only by ostracizing the Jewish community? This is precisely what England did from 1290 to 1655 with
the most extreme form of ostracism: total expulsion.
Expulsion of a people one believes to be inferior and rejected becomes
more understandable when you stand before the Strasbourg Cathedral,
completed in 1260. There are two statues: one female (the Church)
triumphantly crowned and proudly holding a cross; the other statue,
also a female, the Synagogue, downhearted, blindfolded, with drooping arms – a sculptured rendition of the “ancient grudge
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The Spiritual Path of Kabbalah
“Mystical Bodies, Mystical Meals: Eating and Embodiment in
Medieval Kabbalah” by Joel Hecker.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
A review essay by Kristin M. Swenson
How does Madonna do it?! I admit a certain wonder bordering on real
admiration for people who have adopted Kabbalah as their definitive
spiritual path… and are still able to maintain a superstar lifestyle. This
stuff is terribly complicated. It’s much easier to imagine Medieval Jews
hunkered down over desks covered with reference documents and
engaged for countless hours in study and debate, rising every now
and then only to shake the dust out of their hair. As for the appeal of
religious traditions that allow for a person’s full humanity – physical as
well as spiritual – this I can understand, having explored dimensions
of pain in biblical poetry. And lately, I’ve been thinking about food and
religion – how food and the mundane physical business of eating can
have spiritual implications and so bear on the whole person.
So Joel Hecker’s “Mystical Bodies, Mystical Meals,” subtitled “Eating
and Embodiment in Medieval Kabbalah” promised to feed my curiosity.
After all, it chronicles Hecker’s “[search] to uncover mystical experiences of the fictional rabbinic illuminates who populate the narratives
and homilies of medieval kabbalah with an aim, ultimately, of finding
the place of eating as an aspect of embodiment within the kabbalistic
ethos.” Body and mind, the spiritual in the physical, food and religion,
embodiment and mysticism—so far so good. Indeed, Hecker (associate
professor of Jewish mysticism at the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College) confesses in the introduction that he believes a person’s stomach
can house the spiritual as well as the matzo brei. Nevertheless, by the
end of the book, Hecker does not definitively demonstrate a balance of
body and soul in the kabbalah. Instead, despite the priority that eating
has in the texts that he explored, Hecker finally concludes that real
physical matters play second fiddle to the spiritual for these Jewish
mystics. But no matter, getting to that conclusion through Hecker’s
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exploration is fascinating, and it illuminates a constant ambivalence
that at least allows both food and the body a place at the kabbalists’s
spiritual table.
Hecker suggests that it’s how the kabbalists think, that it’s the mystical
imagination, which bridges the gap between food and spirit. He writes
of the kabbalists’ “eating with sacramental intent,” of participating
through flights of mystical imagination in the manna and quail picnics
of the ancient Israelites and dining with Temple priests on the showbread of long ago while eating in the present. In the process of eating
like this with such intention, the food consumed feeds the kabbalists’
spirits, too. But much of their discussion of food serves a metaphorical
or symbolic function to describe the give-and-take between God and
people that may well have nothing to do with actual meat and bread.
The book begins with a survey of the relationship between food and
religion in the Hebrew bible and in Judaism before the development
of the kabbalah. Although preliminary, I found this chapter especially
interesting and helpful. Hecker divides the biblical references into the
following categories and sections: Miraculous Foods, Covenantal Meals,
Metaphorical Meals, Human Consumption of Sacrificial Offerings, Food
for God, Dietary Laws, Ritual Slaughter and Blood Prohibition, “You
Shall Not Seethe a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk,” and Celebrating Passover.
After a brief discussion of how the Pharisees understood and controlled
food choices of the Second Temple period, Hecker turns his attention
to a more extended explanation of the “rabbinic development of eating
practices.” This latter includes the idea that a person could be nourished by the Shekinah just as definitely as by the food-stuff in one’s
pantry. Of course it’s to the rabbis that we owe the tomes of dietary
legislation called kashrut. And Hecker notes how these laws served to
distinguish not just what one should and shouldn’t eat but also who is
Jew and who is not. The kabbalists were aware of and made use of all
of these ideas, and Hecker writes, “Out of the profusion of materials,
they carved a coherent, if not homogeneous, set of approaches for
thinking about food and ingesting and incorporating the divine blessing
they sought” (56).
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In the second chapter, titled “‘A Blessing in the Belly’: Mystical Satiation,” Hecker notes how the feeling of satisfaction that comes from
eating enough was considered by the kabbalists to be a prerequisite
for blessing. Consequently, even if one hasn’t exactly filled up on the
material goods of food and drink, it is important to engage the mind in
such a way as to trick the body into feeling full. Hecker also addresses
in this chapter the matter of fasting and sacrifice as paradox – losing
in order to gain, giving up in order to get. He also touches on the
relationship of the pleasures of eating to the pleasures of sex, a topic
Hecker picks up again toward the end of the succeeding chapter concerning “The Role of Idealized Foods.”
Relationship – the connections between an individual’s body and soul,
between two people, and between people in a social context – lies at
the heart of kabbalistic theology and is inseparable from the relationship of a mystic to the Shekinah. Desire, hunger, satiety, and pleasure
are as much a part of the mystic’s experience as they are of the basic
human necessity of eating. Even, Hecker observes, the simple act of
sitting down to a meal has a cognate in the activity that prepares the
contemplative for a visionary experience.
The kabbalists believe that a person can influence God, and Hecker
notes that according to the kabbalah such “theurgy” tops the list of
why the commandments exist. In “‘Blessing Does Not Rest on an Empty Place’: Talismanic Theurgy,” Hecker asks how the kabbalists worked
to get God to give them food – food, that is, in its most spiritual sense
as well as its material sense. The blessings of God flow out from the
Divine in a great river of excess and run all the way down to the person at table, when things go as planned.
But the divine blessings that the kabbalist seeks are not only a function of the individual’s communion with God but also a product of the
individual’s charitable relationship to others. Hecker observes a tradition within the Zohar of associating the act of caring for poor people,
especially of feeding the needy with this flow of blessings. “Furthermore,” he notes, “the commandment is perceived by the Zohar as an
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expression of the interconnectivity of one’s physical environment, one’s
own body, the bodies of one’s guests, and the body of the Divinity”
(178).
All this talk of body would seem to suggest that for the kabbalist,
the material expression of humanity – our bodies and our need for
food – would be primary, the basic means of attaining a mystical union
with God. But finally, according to Hecker, it seems not. For all the
food-based symbolism, metaphors of eating, sexuality and the senses,
eating to the kabbalists is finally more a way of thinking about spiritual matters than a practical bodily necessity with implications for the
spiritual life. As Hecker puts it, “Eating for the Zohar is highly stylized,
without explicit interest in food per se, but it is interested in how the
activity is framed” (179). Finally, for the kabbalists, the spiritual is
firmly fixed as of greatest priority – the rich metaphorical world of
foodstuffs and bodily pleasures are valuable not so much for what they
say about food and body but more for how they serve to imagine the
dynamic relationship that is the self-and/in/of-God.
Kristin M. Swenson is a professor of religious studies at Virginia Commonwealth University and a contributing editor.
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